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Extraterritorial Imperatives
Henry Harfield* and Rachel E. Deming**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The observation that good fences make good neighbors is as applicable
to nations as it is to the individuals to whom Robert Frost spoke.' The
territorial integrity of a nation is recognized by international law and
jealously guarded by each nation's municipal law. It is increasingly difficult, however, to preserve territorial imperatives when the significance of
physical boundaries is lessened by technological advances in transport
and communication. Effective enforcement of the domestic laws of one
country is hampered when the malefactor, or the proof of his guilt, is
located in another country and action in that country in aid of enforcement violates its territorial integrity unless carried out by its officials in
accordance with its own rules of order. The object of this paper is to
identify and comment on the consequences that flow from the failure by
national neighbors to maintain good fences.
To that end, it is useful to focus on the example of so-called bank
secrecy as one illustration that demonstrates the catalog of problems
caused by extraterritorial imperatives. The following five cases provide a
framework for analyzing these problems.
In FirstNationalCity Bank of New York v. IRS ("FirstNational")2 ,
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") requested the production of
records of a corporation's accounts maintained at the head office of a
U.S. bank and at its branch office in Panama.3 In response to a subpoena
duces tecum, the bank produced the records of the account maintained at
its office in the United States but declined to produce records of the account maintained in Panama. Refusal was based on a contention that
Panamanian law prohibited production. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals required production, finding that there was insufficient proof
that Panama would impose criminal sanctions on the branch for compli* Counsel, formerly a senior partner, Shearman & Sterling, New York; LL.B., Columbia University, 1937; B.A., Yale University, 1934.
** Associate, Shearman & Sterling, New York; J.D., University of Michigan, 1982; A.B., University of Michigan, 1977.
1 R. FROST, Mending Wall, in COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 47 (1959).
2 First Nat'l City Bank of New York v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cer. denied, 361 U.S.
948 (1960) [hereinafter FirstNationalJ.
3 In Re First Nat'l City Bank of New York, 166 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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ance with the subpoena.4 Following a change in Panamanian law which
imposed a nominal fine for compliance with a foreign subpoena, the same
court declined
to enforce a similar subpoena that was served on another
5
U.S. bank.
In the foregoing cases, enforcement of the subpoenas was sought by
the U.S. Government or one of its agencies. In Ings v. Ferguson,6 a
trustee in bankruptcy sought to enforce subpoenas requiring production
of records maintained in Cuba and Canada served on three Canadian
banks with agencies in the United States. The district court quashed the
subpoena insofar as it applied to records of the Cuban branch of one of
the banks, finding that Cuban criminal law prohibited compliance, but
enforced it in respect of the records of the Canadian branch on the
ground that applicable Canadian law imposed no criminal sanctions for
compliance. 7 On appeal the Second Circuit reversed the order enforcing
the subpoena, holding that the proper procedure was to seek judicial
assistance from Canada in the form of letters rogatory or similar means. 8
As the Second Circuit explained,
Upon fundamental principles of international comity, our courts
dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such action
as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the
least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures. Whether removal of records from Canada is prohibited is a question of Canadian
law and is best resolved by Canadian courts.... Full opportunity to
obtain such a decision is afforded
to the Trustee by the procedural laws
9
of this country and Canada.
United States v. First National City Bank'0 ("Omar") involved an
attempt by the IRS to levy on property of a Uruguayan entity, Omar,
S.A. The IRS served a notice of levy on the bank's New York head office
affecting property of or debts due to Omar in the United States. The
District Court granted an injunction restraining the foreign branches of
the bank from disposing of any property held by those branches for
Omar or repaying any deposits or other debts owed to Omar. The bank
had no property or accounts for Omar in the United States, and it appealed from the order enjoining its foreign branches. A panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the injunction, and its
decision was confirmed after an en banc review." The Government
4 First National, 271 F.2d at 619-20; cf United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962).
5 In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
6 Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
7 In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
8 Ings, 282 F.2d at 152-53.
9 Id. at 152.
10 United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) [hereinafter Omar].
I United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), affid on rehearing, 325
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sought and was granted a writ of certiorari. By a seven-to-two margin,
the Supreme Court reinstated the injunction.' 2 Writing for the majority,
Justice Douglas asserted that the order merely froze the accounts and did
not require the transfer of any property or indebtedness payable outside
the United States into the United States; the record contained no satisfactory proof that the laws of any foreign country specifically prohibited
obedience to it; and, given the interest of the United States in protecting
its revenues, it was appropriate to make an order that did no more than
maintain the "status quo." 13 Justice Harlan dissented,' 4 basing his opinion on reasoning underlying the decision he wrote for an eight-to-one
majority in Banco Nacionalde Cuba v. Sattatino.15 In Sabbatino,Justice

Harlan wrote an analytical history of the act of state doctrine and reaffirmed the longstanding principle that the courts of this country should
not adjudicate the validity of acts taken by a foreign sovereign within its
own territory. 6 In his Omar dissent, he again stressed the territorial
limits of the U.S. courts and disagreed with the majority's position that
U.S. courts have the jurisdiction to impose a freeze on property owned by
a foreign national and located in another country."
In United States v. First National Bank ("Loveland"),"8 a federal
grand jury investigating a possible violation of the antitrust laws, served
the head office of the bank in New York with a subpoena requiring production of the records of the Frankfurt, Germany, branch relating to
accounts maintained with it by a German target of the investigation.
The bank moved to quash .the subpoena on the ground that German law
prohibited disclosure. It was conceded that no criminal sanctions would
attach to the bank's compliance, and the Government opposed the motion largely on that ground. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's order enforcing the subpoena. 9 Writing for the court, Judge
Kaufman noted that as a general proposition courts in the United States
should refrain from requiring action in a foreign country that violated
the laws or clearly articulated policies of that country, without regard to
whether such laws were criminal or civil in nature.20 In keeping with his
F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1964). There were at that time nine active judges on the Court of Appeals. One
recused himself, and another died after argument but before decision, so that the decision of the
majority of the panel was confirmed by a four-to-three vote.
12 Omar, 379 U.S. at 381-85.
13 Id. at 384-85.
14 Id. at 385-410.
15 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
16 Id. at 421-28.
17 Omar, 379 U.S. at 385, 410.
18 United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) [hereinafter Loveland].
19 Id. at 905.
20 Id. at 902. Judge Kaufman stated that there was no satisfactory proof that compliance by
the bank would violate a law or clearly articulated policy of Germany. Id. at 903-04.
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construction of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law,2 1 however, he declared that when the interest of the forum state in requiring
the action outweighed the interest
of the foreign state in prohibiting it
22
enforcement was appropriate.
In concept, judicious weighing of competing national interests is appealing, 23
but only if the weighmaster has no actual or perceived conflict of
interest.
Until recently, significant decisions enforcing orders requiring action outside the jurisdiction of the forum state involved the government
of the United States seeking information from nationals of the United
States. A novel element was introduced in recent cases sustaining the
lawfulness of orders requiring resident aliens to act unlawfully in foreign
countries. 24
These latter cases identify a disorder that is endemic among multinational enterprises, and may best be exemplified by a typical bank secrecy issue. A banking institution is organized and exists under the laws
of Erewhyna (the "home country") and maintains establishments for the
conduct of its business in a number of foreign countries (the "host countries"). In its home country, the bank's branch or branches are required
to conduct their affairs subject to and in accordance with the laws of the
home country. As a condition to the conduct of business in host countries, the bank's branches are required to operate in accordance with the
laws of the respective host countries.
1. The bank has no branch and does not transact business in the United
States. It has a branch in Host A, whose laws prohibit any bank or bank
employee from disclosing account records or any information concerning
the affairs of a bank customer. Violation of those laws is punishable by
substantial fines, incarceration, and, in the case of the bank, forfeiture of
its license to do business in Host A. A federal grand jury in the United
States is investigating charges that one Kruc, a national of Libya, resident in Brazil, has violated U.S. law by bringing into and selling within
the United States large quantities of heroin. Kruc is believed to maintain
accounts with the bank's branch in Host A. Victor (Vic) Timm, a Swedish national resident in Host A and employed as an assistant manager of
the bank's branch in that country, arrives in Miami in transit to Brazil,
where he intends to meet with Kruc; he has in his briefcase the bank's
credit file and a transcript of Krue's account. At the Miami airport he is
served with a grand jury subpoena requiring him to appear forthwith to
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).

22 Omar, 379 U.S. at 902.
23 "I'll be judge, I'll be jury," said cunning old Fury; "I'll try the whole cause and condemn
you to death." C.L. DODGSON, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 21 (1979).

24 Although the Ings case involved requests for information from resident aliens, the court did
not require the resident aliens to contravene the laws of any foreign country. Ings, 282 F.2d at 149.
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testify about Kruc's dealings with the branch of the bank in Host A and
to produce all and any records in his possession relating to Kruc's affairs.
Upon his refusal, based on the mandate of Host A law, he is held in
contempt and incarcerated, and the records in his possession are produced to the grand jury.2 5
2. The bank has a branch in the United States and a branch in Host A.
In the matter of Kruc, a federal grand jury subpoena is served on the
U.S. branch. In response to that subpoena, the manager of the U.S.
branch appears and states under oath that neither he nor any officer or
employee of the U.S. branch has any knowledge of Kruc's relation with
the bank, that the branch has no records of any sort relating to Kruc,
and that the Host A branch is prohibited by Host A law from producing
its records, if any, except with its customer's consent or pursuant to order of a Host A court. The Host A branch, thereupon, applies to a court
in that country for permission to comply with the subpoena. Permission
is refused and the branch is enjoined by the Host A court from complying. The branch in the United States is held in contempt and fined for
the failure of the Host A branch to violate the law and defy the order of
the Host A court.26
3. Both the Home Country and Host A have placed an embargo on
trade with North Orienta or its nationals. The United States has not
done likewise; it maintains cordial relations with North Orienta. The Inquisitorial Authority of Host A (which, very roughly, corresponds to a
federal grand jury) is conducting an investigation of Traders Ltd., a corporation chartered by and doing business in Host A, and of an individual
who is a resident national of Host A and the registered owner of all that
company's stock. The Authority suspects that Traders and the individual owner of its stock are alter egos (i.e., "fronts" or "covers") for one
Kay Rattie, a resident of the United States, who, the Authority suspects,
is a national of North Orienta, and owns a ninety percent interest in Inscrutable Enterprises, a U.S. partnership. which holds in pledge all the
shares of Traders as security for loans to Traders' sole stockholder.
There are two concurrent developments. The Authority serves on
the Host A branch of the bank a subpoena requiring the bank to produce
in Host A any and all account records, correspondence, credit files and
other documents in the possession of the bank's U.S. branch which relate
to Traders, Inscrutable Enterprises, and Rattie, or any of them. At or
about that time, a federal grand jury in the United States, suspecting that
Rattie, Inscrutable Enterprises and Traders, or any two or more of them,
may have conspired to defraud the United States by underpayment of
25 See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Field (In re Grand
Jury Proceedings); 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
26 See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 740 F.2d 817
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
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income taxes, serves on the U.S. branch of the bank a subpoena requiring
the bank to produce in the United States all records and documents, expressly including those in the possession of the bank's Host A branch
which relate to the suspected conspirators, or any of them.
A. The bank declines to produce in Host A the documents of its
U.S. branch on the ground that to do so would violate U.S. law.27 Upon
application of the Authority, a court in Host A holds the bank and its
local manager in contempt, incarcerates the manager and imposes a daily
fine on the branch.
B. The bank declines to comply with the grand jury subpoena in
the United States insofar as it requires production of records of the Host
A branch on the ground that to do so would violate Host A law. A court
in the United States holds the bank and its local manager in contempt,
incarcerates the manager and imposes a daily fine on the branch.
C. In order to free its manager and stop the running of the daily
fine in Host A, the head office of the bank, in its home country, instructs
the U.S. branch to comply with the Host A subpoena. Upon so doing,
the bank and the manager of the U.S. branch are indicted by a federal
grand jury and convicted for violation of U.S. law. As a result, a substantial fine is imposed on the bank, and its U.S. manager is sentenced to
a year in the penitentiary.
D. In order to free its manager and stop the running of the daily
fine in the United States, the bank instructs the Host A branch to comply
with the U.S. subpoena. Upon so doing, the bank and its manager in
Host A are indicted and convicted for violation of the laws of that country. As a result, the bank's license to do business in Host A is revoked, a
substantial fine is imposed on the bank, and its Host A manager is sentenced to five years in the penitentiary.
II.

STATUS OF RESPONDENT

The common denominator in all the cases that involve third parties
in extraterritorial discovery is that the one called upon to act is a witness
and not a party to the controversy. When there is a conflict between the
mandate of the forum and that of a foreign country forbidding compliance with that order, it is obvious that there is a serious detriment
to the
28
prospective actor who has no interest in the controversy.
27 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 999 (1983), 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (1983).
28 Different considerations apply when the actor is a party to the litigation and seeks to impose
liability on, or escape liability to, another party. Production of testimonial or documentary evidence
outside the territory of the forum may be essential to establish a claim or defense, but may be barred
by the law of another country. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that the appropriate sanction is not to dismiss the claim or defense, but rather to deny the recalcitrant party the
benefit of the unavailable evidence. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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The nationality of the witness does not affect the weight of the burden imposed, although some courts have relied on the fact that the witness is an individual or corporate citizen of the United States to justify
requiring the citizen to violate the laws of the foreign country. 9 Implicit
in these decisions is the concept that the burden imposed by the courts is
a reasonable incident of citizenship. 0
Even more serious questions are raised when the burden is imposed
on one who is neither an interested party nor a national of the country
requiring that detrimental action be taken outside its sovereignty, such as
when lawfully resident aliens are required by a host country to violate the
laws of their home country or another host country. One court
remarked,
[I]t causes us considerable discomfort to think that a court of law
should order a violation of law, particularly on the territory of the
sovereign whose law is in question.... Most important to our decision
is the fact that these sanctions represent an attempt by an American
court to compel a foreign person to violate the laws of a different sovereign on that sovereign's own territory.3 '
Although some have argued that the privilege of residing or conducting business activities within a country carries with it all the obligations of citizenship, the argument destroys itself for the following
reasons. Consider an enterprise which owes primary allegiance to its
home country and conducts business in Host Country A and Host Country B. If each host country imposes penalties both for violations of its
own orders and for failure to violate the laws of other hosts, the result is
an auction in which the enterprise is knocked down to the most brutal
bidder. The consequence, as suggested by the three situations previously
described,3 2 is an anomaly in decisional law that raises serious and difficult questions of constitutional magnitude.
The burden of seeking information from a foreign source should lie
with the party seeking the information. As discussed above, if the litigant is a private litigant, the appropriate procedure is for the litigant to
seek the assistance of the courts in the foreign country rather than impose a burden on an uninvolved third party.3 3 Some courts, however,
have apparently ignored this approach when the U.S. Government requested the information. 34 But should courts issue subpoenas requesting
29 Loveland, 396 F.2d at 900-01; First National, 271 F.2d at 620.
30 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); First National, 271 F.2d at 620.
31 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 498.
32 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
33 Ings, 282 F.2d at 152; see supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
34 See, eg., Bank ofNova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 825. In that case, the third-party witness claimed
that production of the requested information violated the law of the Cayman Islands. In an effort to
resolve the problem of conflicting laws, the government of the Cayman Islands had proposed proce-
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information from an uninvolved party when production of that information constitutes a prima facie violation of the law of a foreign country,
especially when the person requesting the information has made no effort
to obtain the information through judicial procedures established in the
foreign country? And is it fair to impose sanctions for lack of good faith
in producing such information when the person requesting the information recognizes that he could not obtain the information directly, but can
only get it by requiring the innocent third party to violate the law of
another sovereign? Other courts have indicated a negative answer to
both these questions, even when the requesting party is the United
States. as
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JUDICIARY

There are two propositions that seem self-evident. Every sovereign
state has exclusive right to prescribe and enforce rules of conduct within
its territory. Because that right is exclusive, no state has the right to
prescribe and enforce rules governing conduct in the territory of another
sovereign state. 36 The breadth of those propositions must be defined by
considerations of allegiance.
A state may prescribe rules governing conduct of its nationals
outside its territory, but may enforce those rules only by action against
its national within its own territory.3 7 A state may not prescribe rules
governing extraterritorial conduct of aliens, but to the extent that such
conduct has a territorial effect violating domestic rules, may enforce
those rules by action in its own territory against the alien.3 8 A state
which seeks to coerce its national to act in another state in violation of
the latter's domestic rules of conduct has no right to enforce that action
in the foreign state, nor to proscribe enforcement by the foreign state,
within its territory, of its domestic rules.39 It would seem to follow that a
state has no right (as distinct from power) to coerce a friendly alien,
whose lawful activities subject him to its jurisdiction, to violate the domestic rules of conduct established by a foreign state of which he is a
dures for cooperation in production of information protected by Cayman bank secrecy laws. The
U.S. Government responded that it would "try out the proposed procedures," but that it retained
the right to order production of such information from persons or institutions in the United States.
Id. at 823-24. The U.S. Government subsequently sought, and the court imposed, sanctions against
the third-party witness for failure to produce all the information requested. Id. at 820.
35 See, eg., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 498-99.
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

ment b, 37 comment b (1965).
37 Id.

§§

7 comment a, 30.

38 Id. §§ 17, 20 comment b.
39 Id. §§ 30 comments b, c, 37 comment b.

§§

20 com-
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national or resident."
The vexatious problem, of which the bank secrecy cases are typical,
arises when an individual or enterprise faces conflicting mandates of
states to whose jurisdictions he or it is amenable. A requirement of extraterritorial action has implications for the jurisprudence and economic
concerns of the state imposing the requirement, as well as for international law.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in detail the international law and the economic aspects. It does seem clear that intrusion of
one state on the internal affairs of another raises questions of international law that are no less important when the intrusion is covert, or
otherwise indirect, than when it is direct.4 1 Experience demonstrates
that expansive use of extraterritorial process produces retaliatory measures.4 2 The adverse effect on international commercial and financial intercourse is evident. The implications for the jurisprudence of the United
States, which may be less evident, are nevertheless serious and may be of
constitutional magnitude.
The questions may be encapsulated as follows: Fairness has been
recognized as a fundamental of our system of law.43 Is it fair to use the
judicial power of the United States to coerce, in a friendly foreign state,
action that would not be tolerated if a foreign state sought to coerce such
action in the United States? Is it fair to penalize one who is subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States for his failure to act in a foreign state so
as to subject him in that state to penalties for violation of its domestic
rules of order? If, in either case, the judicial power of the United States is
applied unfairly, does the sanction imposed constitute a deprivation of
property or liberty without due process of law?
Different but equally troublesome questions arise when, at the instance of the executive branch, the judicial branch makes an order that,
in like circumstances, it would decline to make at the instance of a private litigant. In that situation, the constitutionally required independence of the judicial branch may be compromised in two respects.
See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 498-99.
One possible illustration is the War of 1812 (which nobody won): "Nominally the quarrel
with Britain was over her preying on American sailors and her support of restless Indians on the
northwest frontiers of the United States." C. BEARD & M. BEARD, BASIc HISTORY OF THE UNrrED
STATES 172 (1944). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 146-50 (judgment on the merits).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 Reporters' notes at 121.
43 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
"[W]hen a foreign sovereign asserts a claim in a United States court, the consideration of 'fair dealing' bars the state from asserting a defense of sovereign immunity to defeat a setoff or counterclaim."
Id. (quoting National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 365, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 913
40
41

(1955)).
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When the criterion for an extraterritorial order is whether the national interest of the United States served by compliance outweighs the
national interest of a foreign state in protecting its conflicting domestic
law, should the judicial branch "sit in judgment on the acts of another
[state] done within its own territory" despite its long-standing rule to the
contrary? 4 In this context, a Court of Appeals said:
[W]e see good reason for courts not to act on their own, even at
the urging of the executive branch, when their actions may "hinder
rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and
45
for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere."2
When a court in the United States declines to exercise the judicial
power of the United States to coerce extraterritorial action requested by a
private litigant, on the ground that to do so would be contrary to principles of law declared by the judicial branch, should it exercise its power at
the urging of the executive branch despite the evident disparity? Among
the reasons the Sabbatino court assigned for declining to adjudicate the
validity of a foreign act of state, even at the urging of the executive
branch, was its perception that the Constitution proscribes encroachment
by one branch of government upon the functions allocated to another."
When the judicial branch has established as principles of law that
the judicial power of the United States may not be invoked to examine
the validity of a foreign state's acts within its own territory, or to compel
extraterritorial action in certain circumstances, does exercise of that
power at the instance of the executive amount to tolerance of an unconstitutional encroachment on the independence of the judicial branch?
The authors do not pause to answer the foregoing questions, because
the answers are not theirs to give. But comment may not be amiss.
IV.

HARD CASES MAKE UNJUST LAW

The judicial decisions that condone and perpetuate the anomalous
treatment of territoriality have been formulated, especially of late, in the
context of private behavior that is regarded by all (or almost all) nations
as intolerably antisocial.4 7 These are the "hard" cases that make rules
which, when applied to conduct that is not so universally decried, make
law that is at best dubious and at worst, bad indeed. When the legal
44 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
45 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 499, (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423); see also International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
46 The importance of the independence of the judiciary was recently noted by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Brennan at a meeting of justices from around the world. Justices Rehnquis4
Brennan Speak on Constitution, 13 COLUM. U. REc. 8 (1987).
47 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 499.
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mandate of one nation conflicts with that of another nation, political and
economic factors cannot be divorced from those that shape
jurisprudence.
Indeed, the combined effect of economic factors and decisions in
"hard" cases may fairly be said to distort jurisprudence. The simple fact
is that the legal mandate of one country has of itself no legal effect in the
territory of another country. The proposition may be illustrated by reference4 8 to the recent case of Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust
Co.

Libyan Arab Foreign Bank ("LAB"), a Libyan governmental entity,
maintained deposit accounts, denominated in U.S. dollars with Bankers,
a U.S. national, at the latter's head office in New York and at its branch
office in London. In January 1986, U.S. law, in the form of an Executive
Order, forbade payment of debts to Libyan governmental entities by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. By its terms that law
applied to the London branch as well as to the U.S. offices of Bankers.
To be sure, the law had an initial extraterritorial effect in that Bankers
London refused to make payments to or upon order of LAB. That was,
however, a practical rather than a legal effect. Had Bankers London
failed to respect the U.S. law, it would have been exposed to liability in
the United States, but absent intervention by a court in England, that
disrespect of U.S. law might have had no legal effect in London. In any
event, LAB successfully brought suit in an English court, the result of
which was that the U.S. law was given neither legal nor practical effect in
England. The legal effect, potential liability of Bankers for non-compliance with the Executive Order, necessarily was confined to the territorial
sovereignty of the United States. As a means of egress, the U.S. Government granted Bankers a license to make the payment U.S. law had unsuccessfully forbidden.4 9 One possible moral is that good brakes and
precise steering are essential to those who would play the game of
brinksmanship without unacceptable damage to the vehicles they use.
In Omar, Justice Harlan (dissenting) characterized efforts to establish a jurisdictional justification for extraterritorial legal mandates as
"procedural cake-walking." 5 0 In its origin, "cake-walking" referred to a
dance in which those who performed the most intricate gyrations received a cake as a prize. In the context of extraterritorial legal adventures, the consequence is more likely to be ruptured jurisprudence.

48 1986 L. No. 1567 (Q.B. Sept. 2, 1987).
49 Financial Times, Oct. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
50 Omar, 379 U.S. at 395.

